Why is Flávio Bolsonaro a Different Kind of Danger to Brazilian Democracy?

In recent months, Flávio Bolsonaro has undergone a process of public sanitization. The process began with him being described as "moderate," a mix of analysis and the desire for moderation. It would be a fair trade: if Flávio accepted moderation — that is, played by the rules and interests of that description — he would be the alternative Bolsonaro, the viable Bolsonaro of a palatable anti-Petismo (opposition to the Workers' Party (PT) and its leaders, such as President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva). There is no need to dwell on the blurred vision and limited reach of that premise, but it is important to consider that Flávio Bolsonaro is a different Bolsonaro, yet equally antidemocratic, albeit through other channels:

Coordination with the US

The image of Jair Bolsonaro saluting the US flag and saying "I love you" to Trump is caricatured, but it is necessary to go beyond the snapshot. Flávio Bolsonaro engages with the US at a different moment. Trump II does what is standard practice for autocrats in a second term: closure of the regime, a police-state logic, and draconian measures. The academic literature on democratic crises warns of this, calling it "Subversion by Stealth" or "termite democracy," as described in a brilliant essay by Miguel Lago. In this case, I highlight at least two additional issues related to the US: first, its geopolitical mission for Latin America (the "Trump corollary"), where Brazil matters not only as an instrument of domination, but also as a point of tension with other global powers.

Second, and no less important: the impact of the big networks and the big tech oligarchs, who have not only taken a strategic position in Trump II, but speak openly about recent far-right theories that combine discredit of democracy (hence far-right) with the defense of administrations articulated by new oligarchs and their structures of new governance. The presence of Peter Thiel in Argentina provides a triangulation for the technical operation of this worldview and the management of large volumes of data, one that understands the world through a certain big-data logic, where democratic participation is a deviation from the pattern that is harmful to social cohesion, and where the independent press is likewise pernicious.

Within this scenario, one more point deserves emphasis: When Flávios brother Eduardo Bolsonaro (and his entourage) moved to the US, it was not a mere escape; it was a strategic retreat and a bet on Trump II. The fruits of this coordination pay off handsomely, whether in terms of a language attuned to this autocratic-digital relationship of Trump II, or through networks of influence and (as many say) of financing. Note the recent case of the Rockbridge Network and allegations of methods of intervention in the Brazilian electoral process. So we are not facing a picture similar to Donald Duck visiting Zé Carioca in Brazil in that amusing cartoon. There is a distinct and more complex moment, in which Bolsonarism takes on a protagonism inversely proportional to the notion of national sovereignty. Where they win, the status of independence and autonomy loses. It is a calculated project, and the Brazilian far right has much to learn from Javier Milei — though without the caricatural condition.

The Judiciary Tangle

The phrase “terribly evangelical” was used by former President Jair Bolsonaro in July 2019 to describe the profile of one of the justices he intended to nominate to the Federal Supreme Court (STF). After all, what is a "terribly evangelical" man? One needs only to look at minister André Mendonça over these weeks of tension with other justices, with allegations of involvement in networks of shady dealings and influence peddling. It is the acknowledgment of a willingness to operate certain logics that go beyond any sense of self-preservation of one of the branches of the Republic. Mendonça is terribly evangelical precisely because he is willing to operate this fraying.

Looking from another perspective, we will see how the hypothetical Judiciary of Bolsonaro II will involve a new structure (impeachment of justices), a new leadership (focus on the terribly [evangelical]), and the impact of agendas of global interest (again, the question of platforms, radicalization of youth, etc.). Not forgetting the evangelical element in this order, which provides a different social and mobilization base. In other words, the Judiciary of Bolsonaro II will be a great ally for consolidating the structures of deep and lasting transformation of Brazilian society.

The Military Characteristic

Bolsonaro II lacks the military apparatus as a characterizing element, which is not a problem for antidemocratic ambitions. In reality, it is precisely this that enables the hypothetical Flávio to go beyond Jair. The military presence in Jair involved, first of all, a constraint on Bolsonaro I's broader political maneuverings.

It should come as no surprise that a Bolsonaro II will have a smaller military presence in strategic posts, though it will make routine nods toward the militarization of the cultural sphere (possibly education and proposals for the "universalization" of civic-military schools). While militarization will bring an authoritarian everyday culture and a management of public security (here it bears echoing the example of Bukele and the role of the Judiciary), the political arrangements for the military field will have a certain limitation. And why is this important? It is the possibility of Flávio detaching himself from Jair from the standpoint of the techniques and strategies of rupture with democratic stability. The classic model no longer fits in the second decade of the 21st century, and Bolsonaro II is aware of this. Flávio will not mobilize reserve paratroopers, but will operate from a less centralized and more encompassing network.

Political Coordination and the Militia Logic

In this sense, Flávio Bolsonaro is the clan's political operator. He knows how to operate, coordinate, and engage with different sectors — but this does not give Flávio a democratic nature. He is not the figure of moderation, but precisely of the breadth of political capability.

That is why Flávio must be understood, from a family history and also a personal one, as someone who knows how to operate a network that simultaneously involves political-institutional actors and the influence and coordination network of the militias. It is worth emphasizing once again that the relationship with Trump II is one more very important asset in this scenario, where the designation of certain factions as terrorist entities provides a device for draconian measures, while at the same time opening space for a parallel-militia network of governance in reverse.

The Anti-Republican Perspective and the Pursuit of Massification

Along these paths, the picture that emerges is one of the fraying of democratic structures and institutions that, in various ways, managed to block the fall of Brazilian democracy in recent years. But what about Jair Bolsonaro? The promise has already been stated publicly: his father's liberation and his return to the political scene. Jair Bolsonaro's return would solve one of Flávio's great problems, namely the limitation in mobilizing large mass movements.

Flávio would be the political and judicial manager, while Jair would be the articulator of the bases and of antidemocratic radicalization. This is a bet that, I believe, they aim to realize. Indeed, Bolsonarism has demonstrated an immense capacity for resilience. In the coming years, Jair Bolsonaro would consolidate his position as the only popular leader in Brazil. And unlike Lula, Jair will manage to do what the progressive leader never did: generate leaders with long-lasting capacity.

For these reasons, I would argue that the likely presidency of Flávio Bolsonaro is worse, structurally speaking, than what was the disaster (and crime) of Jair Bolsonaro's administration, precisely because he will have a perfect scenario for realizing the antidemocratic desires of the groups that make up the constituent universe of Bolsonarism. As a researcher, I maintain that it is necessary to understand and grasp things as they are, and therefore it is necessary to characterize Flávio Bolsonaro, Bolsonaro II, as a right-wing extremist. Brazilian democracy is facing a great test.

Odilon Caldeira Neto is a historian, coordinator of the Brazilian Observatory on the Far Right (Observatório da Extrema Direita), and a professor at the Federal University of Juiz de Fora (UFJF).

Redaktion: Susanne Brust, Übersetzung: Andrea Dip