How Washington's Terrorist Label Could Redraw Brazil's Sovereignty

In early March, the United States government declared that it considers the Brazilian criminal organizations Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV) significant regional security threats, citing their involvement in drug trafficking, violence, and transnational crime. The statement, confirmed by the U.S. Department of State, came after reports that the Trump administration was weighing the possibility of formally labeling the groups as terrorist organizations. In May 2025, Brazil's then–National Secretary of Justice, Mário Sarrubo, disclosed that he had already rejected a U.S. request to that effect, arguing that the factions do not meet the criteria established by Brazil's Anti-Terrorism Law (Law 13.260/2016), which requires a political, ideological, or discriminatory motivation. In the Brazilian government's view, the PCC and CV are driven by economic interests, not political ones, and should therefore be treated as criminal organizations rather than terrorist groups.

Brazilian authorities and researchers warn that such a classification could be used to justify U.S. military action in the region, drawing comparisons to operations previously conducted in Colombia and Venezuela under the guise of combating drug trafficking. Diplomatic sources confirmed that the matter was raised directly between Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. São Paulo prosecutor Lincoln Gakiya, a leading expert on organized crime who has investigated the PCC for over two decades, cautioned, in interview for a brazilian radio, that the reclassification would pose a direct threat to Brazilian sovereignty, potentially opening the door to covert CIA operations or U.S. special forces missions on Brazilian soil. Beyond the sovereignty risks, he warned of sweeping economic consequences, including sanctions and the exodus of multinational companies, as well as a breakdown in intelligence cooperation, with sensitive data likely to be redirected from law enforcement channels to military and intelligence agencies such as the CIA.

Later march, The New York Times reported that the push to designate the Brazilian factions as terrorist organizations had gained new momentum following lobbying by the sons of former President Jair Bolsonaro within Trump administration circles. Although the White House has framed such designations as a response to threats against U.S. national security, Rubio nonetheless informed Minister Vieira at a regional summit that Washington intended to proceed with the listing. The Lula administration rejected the proposal outright. Back in Brazil, right-wing legislators continued to advance a bill that would equate gang-related crimes with acts of terrorism.

The prospect of a terrorist designation carries particular weight in an election year, stoking concerns that it could serve as both a pretext for foreign intervention and a political weapon for Brazil's far right, which has spent years attempting to tie President Lula to organized crime. Those concerns were brought into sharp relief in October 2025, when a police operation in Rio de Janeiro left over 120 people dead. Michelle Bolsonaro, president of the Women's Liberal Party and Jair Bolsonaro’s wife issued an official statement endorsing the raid, branding Brazilian traffickers as "narcoterrorists" and accusing Lula, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, and Colombian President Gustavo Petro of forming a "Trio of Destruction" working in concert to protect criminal networks.

Rise of the term Narcoterrorism

In the aftermath of the operation, the term narcoterrorism spread rapidly through far-right media and religious networks. Evangelical outlets amplified the Rio de Janeiro state government's framing, portraying organized crime as an existential threat and casting the Lula administration's refusal to adopt the label as evidence of complicity. Bolsonaro-aligned politicians, among them Nikolas Ferreira, Magno Malta, and Michelle Bolsonaro, drove the narrative forward, while the R7 news portal, owned by Bishop Edir Macedo of Universal Church, offered a more uneven picture: some of its coverage echoed the terrorist framing, while other reports noted that narcoterrorism carries no legal standing in Brazil and functions primarily as a political and geopolitical signaling tool aligned with U.S. interests. On social media, conservative figures including Bia Kicis, Chris Tonietto (two of the lawmakers most closely aligned with Bolsonarism, who are particularly active in opposing reproductive rights and LGBT rights), and pastor Silas Malafaia (Jair Bolsonaro’s advisor) cast the conflict in moral terms, invoking the language of a battle between good and evil.

The growing currency of the term narcoterrorism in Brazilian political and religious discourse reveals a deliberate effort by far-right sectors to reframe debates on crime and public security in line with global authoritarian narratives and are very concerning, specially with Flávio Bolsonaro rising in the polls. By casting criminal organizations as terrorist threats, this rhetoric risks legitimizing foreign military intervention, inflaming diplomatic tensions, and entrenching ideological polarization at a moment when Brazil's democratic institutions are already under strain.